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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUN1Y OF FRANKLIN

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·x

In the Matter of the Application of
JACOB KIM, #13-R-3223,
Petitioner,

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJT #16-1-2014-0501.98
INDEX# 2014-915
ORI #NY016015J

for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules
-againstTINA STANFORD, Chairwoman,
NYS Board of Parole,
Respondent.

This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Jacob Kim, verified on November 21, 2014 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk's office on November 26, 2014. Petitioner, who is an inmate at
the Bare Hill Correctional Facility, is challenging the February

2014

determination

denying him discretionary parole release and directing that he be held for an additional
24

months. The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on December 2,

2014

and has

received and reviewed respondent's Answer and Return, including in camera
materials, verified on January 9,

2015

and supported by the Letter Memorandum of

Glen Francis Michaels, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, dated January 9,

2015.

The

Court has also received and reviewed petitioner's Reply thereto, sworn to on
January 16, 2015 and filed in the Franklin County Clerk's office on January

23, 2015.

As part of petitioner's Reply he interposed an objection to the respondent's

submiss ion of in camera materials. After asserting that he never had an opportunity
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to inspect such materials for accuracy or validity and that he does not even know the
subject matter or nature of the documents, petitioner asserted that " ... this Court
should either (a) strike the 'confidential documents' from the record with prejudice, or
(b) compel the respondent to produce these documents to me for inspection forthwith.
The 'due process clause' of the Federal constitution requires nothing less."
By Decision and Order dated April 14, 2015 the respondent was " ... directed
to provide chambers with such materials as she deems appropriate setting forth the
statutory, regulatory and/or penological bases for not providing petitioner with an
unredacted copy of the COMPAS instrument and/or the 'Confidential' portion of the
parole report .. ." In response thereto the Court has received and reviewed the Letter
Memorandum ofChristopherJ. Fleury, Esq.,AssistantAttorneyGeneraI; dated May I,
2015.
The Court has examined the un-redacted copy of the 13-page COMPAS risk
assessment instrument that. was provided to chambers by the respondent for in

camera review. Although the redacted portions of the COMPAS instrument do not
appear to be of major significance vis a vis the February 2014 parole denial
. determination, the Court ultimately concludes that the redacted material does
represent intra-DOCCS communication that is evaluative in nature and designed to
assist the Parole Board in determining whether or not petitioner should be granted
discretionary parole release. At such, the Court finds that such material was properly
redacted from the copy of the COMPAS instrument provided to petitioner. See

Ramahlo v. Bruno, 273 AD2d 52i.
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The Court has also examined the two-page "confidential" section of the
January 8, 2014 Parole Board Report that was provided to chambers by the respondent
for in camera review. Although the confidential section of the report, like the redacted
portions of the COMPAS instrument, does not appear to be of major significance vis
a vis the February 2014 parole denial determination, the Court ultimately concludes
that the confidential section references, and is based upon, intra-DOCCS
communication that is evaluative in nature and designed to assist the Parole Board in
determining whether or not petitioner should be granted discretionary parole release.
As such, the Court finds that the confidential section of the Parole Board report was
properly withheld from petitioner. See Ramahlo v. Bruno,
On October

31, 2013

273 AD2d 521.

petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, Queens

County, as a second felony offender, to an indeterminate sentence of 11/2 to 3 years
upon his conviction of the crime of Attempted Promoting Prostitution 3°. At the time
petitioner committed the criminal acts underlying his

2013 conviction/sentencing he

was on parole from a prior sentence imposed upon his conviction of the crime of
Attempted Murder

2°

1
•

Petitioner made his first appearance before a Parole Board

(after the 2013 conviction) on February 4, 2014. Following that appearance a decision
was issued denying him discretionary parole release and directing that he be held for

1

Since the 2013 sentence was imposed upon petitioner as a second felony offender, DOCCS officials
calculated such sentence as running consecutively, rather than concurrently, with respect to the unexpired
term of the previous sentence. Thus, the 3-maximum term of the 2013 sentence was aggregated with the
8 years and 9 months (approximately) still owed against the maximum term of the previous sentence.
DOCCS official currently calculate the maximum expiration date of petitioner's aggregated multiple
sentences as August 12, 2024.
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an additional 24 months. The February 2014 parole denial determination reads as follows:
"AFTER A REVIEW OF THE RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THE PANEL
HAS DETERMINED THAT IF RELEASED AT THIS TIME THERE IS A
REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD NOT LIVE AND
REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT AGAINVIOLATINGTHE LAW AND
YOUR RELEASE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE
OF SOCIETY AND WOULD SO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUS NATURE
OF THE CRIME AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW. THIS
DECISION IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING FACTORS: YOUR
INSTANT OFFENSE'S ARE: ATT PROM. OF PROST. 3R0 IN WHICH
YOU ACTED IN CONCERT WITH OTHERS IN A PROSTITUTION
BASED CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE AND DID SO AFTER HAVING BEEN
DEPORTED AND WHILE ON PAROLE FOR ATT. MURDER.
YOUR RECORD DATES BACK TO A 1992 YO ATT. MURDER: 2
FELONIES, 1 YO, PRIOR VIOLENCE, PRIOR PRISON AND FAILURE
AT PRIOR COMMUNITY SUPERVISION.
NOTE IS MADE OF YOUR: SENTENCING MINUTES, COMPAS RISK
ASSESSMENT, REHABILITATIVE EFFORTS, RISKS, CLEAN
DISCIPLINARYRECORD,PAROLEPLAN,ANDALLOTHERFACTORS
REQUIRED BY LAW.
YOU CLEARLY FAILED TO BENEFIT FROM PRIOR EFFORTS AT
LENIENCY AND REHABILITATION. PAROLE IS DENIED."
The document perfecting petitioner's administrative appeal from the February 2014 parole
denial determination was received by the DOCCS Board of Parole Appeals Unit on June 12,
2014.

The Appeals Unit, however, failed to issue its findings and recommendation within

the four-month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006A(c). This proceeding ensued.

Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A,
§38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible vvith the welfare of society and will not

(* 5]

so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates ... (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate while in the custody of the
department [New York State Department of Corrections and Co.mmunity
Supervision] ... (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration
to the type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the
sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the
presen tence probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and
aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement;
and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of
offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole supervision and
institutional confinement . . ."
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Hamilton v. New York State Division ofParole, 119 AD3d 1268,
Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614. Unless the

petitioner makes a "convincing demonstration to the contrary" the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Jackson v. Evans, 118 AD3d 701, Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521
and Zane v. New York State [)ivision of Parole, 231 AD2d 848.
Petitioner advances a variety of arguments in support of his ultimate contention
that the February 2014 parole denial determination must be vacated. One.argument in
particular resonat.es with the Court. On page seven of the document perfecting petitioner's
administrative appeal from the February 2014 parole denial determination (Appellant's
5 of 7
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Brief dated June 2, 2014), which is incorporated by reference into the Petition, it is argued,
in effect, that no Transitional Accountability Plan (TAP) was prepared in conjunction with
the discretionary parole release consideration process. As part of the same legislative
enactment wherein Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) was amended (L 2011, ch 62, Part C,
subpart A), a new Correction Law §71-a was added. This statute provides, in relevant part,
as follows:
"Upon admission of an inmate committed to the custody of the department
[DOCCS] under an indeterminate or determinate sentence of imprisonment,
the department shall develop a transitional accountability plan. Such plan
shall be a comprehensive, dynamic and individualized case management
plan based on the programming and treatment needs of the inmate. The
purpose of such plan shall be to promote the rehabilitation of the inmate
and their successful and productive reentry and reintegration into society
upon release. To that end, such plan shall be used to prioritize programming
and treatment services for the inmate during incarceration and any period
of community supervision."
Correction Law §71-a became effective on October 1, 2011 but it has been determined that
this legislative enactment does not mandate the preparation of TAPs with respect to
inmates in DOCCS custody prior to that date. See Tran v. Evans, 126 AD3d 1196, and
Rivera v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107. This Court notes, however,

that although petitioner was first received into DOCCS custody (in connection with his
Attempted Murder 2° conviction/sentencing) prior to the effective date of Correction Law
§71-a, he was conditionally released from custody (parole for deportation only) on or about
February 17, 2005. Following his October 31, 2013 Queens County conviction/sentencing
petitioner was received back into 09ccs custody on November 19, 2013, after the effective
date of Correction Law §71-a. Under these circumstances the failure of DOCCS officials
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to prepare a TAP upon petitioner's November.19, 2013 re-admission into DOCCS custody
war rants the o,verturning of the February 2014 parole denial determination.

Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition. is granted, without costs or disbursements, but

only to the extent that respondent is directed to develop a TAP for the petitioner and
utilize same in conjunction with de nova parole release consideration, all within 60 days
of the date of this Decision and Judgment.

Dated:

October 19, 2015 at
Indian Lake, New York.
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice

